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THE BASIC LAW AND THE PROCESS
OF REUNIFICATION
Udo Steiner*
I. ONE BASIC LAW FOR THE ENTIRE GERMAN NATION
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES OF REUNIFICATION
1. An "Old" Basic Law But New Constitutional Issues
MONG the dozens of amendments added to the Basic Law dur-
ing the course of its fifty-year history, the Fortieth Amendment,
made in 1990, is of unique significance. It brought about the
constitutional changes which became necessary in the wake of the
Reunification of Germany. Relatively speaking, the actual number of
changes was quite small. Reunification was not a matter of different
states merging and then giving themselves a new joint constitution; the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) actually joined the Federal Repub-
lic. The Basic Law was extended in scope to cover the territory of the
former GDR, and the wording of the revised preamble to the Basic Law
brings this across simply, yet evocatively: thus this Basic Law now applies
to the entire German people.1
Unification itself was implemented by most of the amendments to the
Basic Law introduced during the year of Reunification. This applies
above all to the preamble, as well as to Articles 23 and 146. In 1990, the
Basic Law was modified with just a few specific rules of law to solve the
legal problems created by Reunification. To avoid placing too much
strain on the public purse, the new Article 135(a)(2) allows the federal
legislature to stipulate that financial liabilities of the former GDR do not
have to be discharged, or at least not to their full extent.2 Moreover, the
* Judge, First Senate, Federal Constitutional Court, Karlsruhe, Germany.
1. See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] preamble; see also HANDBUCH DES
STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (J. Isensee & P. Kirchhof eds.,
1997) (for the constitutional issues brought up by Reunification in general); DAVID P. CUR-
RIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 30 (1994) (for refer-
ence to foreign literature); PETER E. QUINT, THE IMPERFECT UNION: CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURES OF GERMAN UNIFICATION (1997); Ryszard W. Piotrowicz, The Arithmetic of
German Unification: Three into One Does Go, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 635 (1991). For
articles by German authors in international journals, see Jochen Abraham Frowein, The
Reunification of Germany, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 152 (1992); Kay Hailbronner, Legal Aspects
of the Unification of the Two German States, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 18 (1991); Albrecht
Randelzhofer, German Unification: Constitutional and International Implications, 13 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 122 (1991).
2. See GG art. 135(a)(2). For an interpretation of this rule, see Norbert Bernsdorff,
Aufhebung oder Kiirzung von Verbindlichkeiten der DDR, 1997 NEUE JURISTISCHE
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Basic Law also waives strict enforcement for a transitional period under
certain circumstances. According to paragraphs 1(1) and (2) of Article
143, laws in former GDR territory ("acceding territory") may to a certain
extent, and for a given period of time (until either December 31, 1992 or
December 31, 1995), diverge from the provisions of the Basic Law-if, as
a result of the discrepancies in prevailing circumstances, full-scale adjust-
ment to the rules of the Basic Law proves unfeasible.3 I will return to the
new regulation in Article 143(3) of the Basic Law later in the article. 4
In practice, these rules were quite significant when it came to overcom-
ing the legal problems posed by implementing Reunification in accor-
dance with the Constitution. By introducing these rules, the Basic Law
set up a safetynet designed to protect the legislature from coming to grief,
in constitutional terms, when tackling the extraordinary problems posed
by this extraordinary event. In hindsight, we see that the answers to the
trickiest constitutional issues brought by Reunification were found in the
provisions of the "old" unrevised Basic Law. This applies particularly to
the basic constitutional rights and similar civil rights pursuant to Articles
2(1), (2); 3(1); 12(1); 14; 33(2); and 103(2) of the Basic Law.
When the Federal Constitutional Court faced solving constitutional is-
sues arising from Reunification in dozens of decisions and rulings issued
over the past ten years, it proved advantageous that the German code of
constitutional procedure allows recourse to the Court in various ways,
including: (1) by way of appeals filed with the Constitutional Court by
individuals claiming that administrative acts-and in particular court
judgments-violate their personal basic rights; 5 (2) on the basis of argu-
ments submitted pursuant to Basic Law, Article 100(1), by judges con-
vinced that a specific rule of law they need to apply in a particular case is
contrary to constitutional law; and (3) by the governments of the new
Linder, who under Basic Law Article 93(1), No. 2, can apply for a judi-
cial review of any provisions in federal law which they claim constricts the
Basic Law. So far, the Constitutional Court has administered justice in
all these various kinds of proceedings.
2. The Federal German Constitutional Court, and the Psychological
Issues Underlying Its Work
Since the early nineties, the entire constitutional debate over the legal
problems posed by Reunification has become a focal point of the work
done by the Federal German Constitutional Court. "Psychologically",
however, the Court's jurisdiction has come under dual pressure. The
Court itself is in Karlsruhe, a location which was and still is located at the
WOCHENSCHRIF [NJW] 2712; ANOREAS HARATSCH, DIE BEFREIUNG VON VERBIN-
DLICHKEITEN NACH ART. 135 A ABS. 2 GG (1998); ULLRICH HEILEMANN & H. WOLF-
GANG REINICKE, WELCOME TO HARD TIMES; THE FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF GERMAN
UNITY (1995).
3. See GG art. 143(1), (2).
4. See infra Part l.B.
5. See GG art. 93(1), No. 4a.
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very western edge of the Republic, both the old and the new. None of
the judges there underwent legal training in East Germany. The East
Germans are always critically scrutinizing the Court for having a "west-
ern" bias, which favors western interests and is marked by western values.
Furthermore, the Federal German Constitutional Court is still suffering
from the impact of what Barbel Bohley, a prominent figure in the GDR
civil rights movement once said,: "[With Reunification] we expected to
get justice, but what we got was the rule of law." Seen from the point of
view of the Basic Law, however, there is no alternative if the outcome of
unjust socialist rule is to be corrected, using the means available to a state
in which the rule of law prevails. This applies equally to both perpetra-
tors and victims of the GDR's communist regime. A peaceful revolution
leaves the task of correcting injustice up to a constitutional state.6
II. SELECTED FOCAL ISSUES FROM THE FEDERAL
GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S RULINGS
ON REUNIFICATION
A. THE GDR's CIVIL SERVICE MOVING FROM COMMUNIST
DICTATORSHIP TO A FREE DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
The employment system in the GDR posed huge problems for the all-
German state. There was gross over-staffing both in the public sector and
in trade and industry. Productivity was low, but levels of employment
were high. Unemployment certainly did exist, but it was a matter of lack
of work while actually on the job. In many areas of the public sector,
even those with specialized qualifications failed to meet the standards of
a modern administration in a constitutional state where the free demo-
cratic communal structure is highly developed. 7
The Basic Law was, and still is, unable to set any normative limits to
the huge loss of jobs which occurred after Reunification in business, in
general, and industry, in particular. The Basic Law quite rightly fails to
acknowledge any state-guaranteed right to work. 8 The principle of a so-
cial state laid out in the Basic Law obliges the state to pursue no more
than an active employment policy and to provide minimum social security
in the event of unemployment. 9
6. See Josef Isensee, Diskussionsbeitrag, 51 VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VER-
EINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 134 (1992); RECHTSSTAAT-VORGABE
UND AUFGABE UND EINUNG DEUTSCHLANDS, 9 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND § 202 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1997).
7. See Hans-Heinrich Trute, Organisation und Personal der DDR, HANDBUCH DES
STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND § 215; BERNHARD SCHLINK, VER-
GANGENHEIT ALS ZUMUTUNG 21 (1996).
8. See BVerfGE 84, 133 (146); Jirgen Kdihling, Die Berufsfreiheit des Arbeitnehmers,
Richterliches Arbeitsrecht, Festschrift fur Thomas Dieterich zum, 65 GEBURTSTAG 325
(1999).
9. See GG arts. 20(1), 28(2)(1).
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As far as the public sector was concerned, however, the Unification
Treaty assumed that the federation and its constituent states (Lander)
should, as a matter of principle, enter into existing employment con-
tracts. 10 The Treaty does include a whole series of factors that permit
summary dismissal, in addition to the factors already permitting routine
dismissal under German Labor Law. In addition, routine termination of
an employment contract in the public sector was permissible until 1994:
[I]f, in view of his or her lack of specialist qualifications or personal
suitability, the employee failed to meet the requirements; or
if with fewer jobs being called for, there was no work for the em-
ployee; or
if the employee's previous place of employment was closed down en-
tirely, or if, in the event of this former place of employment being
merged, incorporated or substantially reorganised and restructured,
it was no longer possible either to keep the employee in his or her
previous job, or to offer them any alternative."
In addition to this, for an indefinite period, the Unification Treaty also
allows summary dismissal if the employee has violated principles of hu-
manity or the rule of law, or has been active for the former GDR ministry
of state security or department of national security, thus rendering it un-
reasonable under the circumstances to uphold the contract. 12
When these grounds for summary notice were applied in the new
LAnder, labor courts were inundated with cases pleading unlawful dismis-
sal. In a whole series of proceedings, the Federal German Constitutional
Court clarified the fundamental constitutional issues arising from this liti-
gation.13 One criterion here has been the constitutional right laid out in
Article 12(1) of the Basic Law, which, in this context, has acquired a new
protective dimension. The Court held the stipulated right to freedom of
choice of occupation or profession was not deemed to constitute the right
to claim provision of a job of one's own choice. Nor did it imply any
guarantee of the continuation of any job, once chosen, in either the public
or private sector. The Court maintained that the protective function of
this basic constitutional right did, however, apply in cases where an indi-
vidual was obliged by the State to give up his or her job. The State also
had a protective duty under Article 12(1) of the Basic Law, which was
sufficiently taken into account in the regulations on dismissal laid out in
German Labor Law.
The Federal German Constitutional Court thus extended the scope of
protection provided by Basic Law, Article 12(1), although in terms of
constitutional law it did not in fact object to the inevitable downsizing in
10. See Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity, Aug. 31, 1990, F.R.G.-G.D.R.,
annex I, ch. XIX, area A, § III, No. 1(2), 30 I.L.M. 457 [hereinafter Unification Treaty].
11. See id.
12. See id. § 5.
13. See BVerfGE 84, 133 (146).
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the former GDR's administration. 14 The absolute necessity was, above
all else, to set up a modern, efficient administration as quickly as possible,
working to the standards of a state founded on the rule of law. The Court
maintained this could only be achieved with reduced personnel, the fi-
nancing of which should not be too great an economic burden on the
State.15
The issue of taking over staffing in ideologically and politically sensi-
tive areas, such as schools and education, was equally explosive. One
important factor was the teachers whose training and practical teaching
experience were committed to the Communist state. These same teach-
ers wanted to work in a school system determined by the principles of the
Basic Law-heeding human dignity and guaranteeing basic rights in a
free and democratically structured State. Thus, when it came to taking
over academic staff, the question of suitability arose-for Article 33(2) of
the Basic Law states that each and every German citizen may have access
to any public office, but that such access is dependent upon aptitude,
qualifications and professional ability.
In the midst of the exceptional upheaval brought about by Reunifica-
tion, the Federal German Constitutional Court stated that only those per-
sons who proved that they were genuinely willing and able to perform
their official duties in accordance with the principles of the Constitution,
were, in terms of the Basic Law, suited to work in public service and, in
particular, to safeguard citizens' personal rights and observe constitu-
tional rules. The Court maintained that people who had already been
employed in the former GDR's education system could also be required
to meet these demands.16 I need scarcely emphasize to my honorable
readers, with their experience of life, in general, and humankind, in par-
ticular, that the task thus imposed on the authorities concerned-namely
verifying the personal views of all former staff in respect of the new val-
ues set out in the Basic Law-posed a virtually insoluble problem.
In this context, incidentally, the Court also added that anyone not tak-
ing on old staff until their suitability had been established would, at the
same time, open up opportunities to new candidates who, for political
reasons, may not have had any access to public service under the GDR
regime. 17 This is, of course, small comfort to persons in former East Ger-
many who, because of their age, are no longer able to take any of the
opportunities now available under the new constitutional order. This just
goes to show how limited the law is, when it subsequently has to cope
with a system, such as that in the GDR, which was neither free nor demo-
cratic. Retrospectively, reunified Germany was unable to put those who
had been at a disadvantage under the GDR regime in the position they
14. Even now, the public sector in the former GDR is still regarded as being over-
staffed.
15. See BVerfGE 84, 133 (151-52).
16. See BVerfGE 92, 140 (151-52).
17. See id. at 152.
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would have enjoyed if they had spent their lives and careers in the West
after the Second World War. And in terms of constitutional law, the Fed-
eral German Constitutional Court has also accepted that this is as far as
making amends can go.
I would like to note that there was no day of reckoning between the
"winners" and "losers" of Reunification in the public sector. I mention
this because a different opinion would seem to prevail in some interna-
tional bodies. For example, according to the figures I have, some 53,000
of the 55,000 teachers in Saxony were taken over. These figures give
some indication of an underlying integration concept, as a result of which
many of the former GDR elite now occupy public posts in the Federal
Republic. As it happens, the question under which conditions GDR
judges or members of state security' 8 may be admitted, in a constitutional
state, to the legal profession19-a judicial institution whose independence
is stipulated in German law-has been dealt with similarly. Here, too,
only relatively few applications have been turned down. 20
There are indeed risks involved in retaining personnel on this scale,
and it was more widespread in education than anywhere else. Staff
rooms are often described as being the most stable GDR environment.
Meanwhile, in schools the foundation is being laid for having the next
generation employed in the interests of a free and democratic order and a
social market economy.
B. GDR PROPERTY LAW AND OUTSTANDING ISSUES-AN OPEN
WOUND IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE?
Doing away with injustices involving real estate is right at the very core
of the series of problems known among experts in Germany as "open
property questions."'21 Back in 1990, when it first launched into dealing
legally with acts of expropriation and sequestration carried out on GDR
territory, which constituted a violation of constitutional rights, reunified
Germany's concept was pretty clear. Expropriations carried out by So-
viet or German authorities on the basis of occupation law between 1945
and 1949 were not going to be reversed. On the other hand, owners of
real estate in the former GDR-those known as "former property own-
ers"-in particular, people who had fled to the West were, as a matter of
principle, to have unlawfully confiscated land and property transferred
back to them. The property involved here belonged to people who-as
GDR authorities officially held-had left the country illegally between
1949 and 1989. Any property owned by such people in the GDR was
either expropriated or sequestrated by the state. Altogether, about 3.5
million people left East Germany during this period.
18. See BVerfGE 93, 213.
19. For pending cases regarding the subject, see I BvR 661/96.
20. See FAZ no. 68, Mar. 17, 1999, at 19, for figures showing application declined.
2 1. See FRITZ OSSENBOHL, Eigentumsfragen, HANDBUCH DES STAAISRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUILIK DEUTSCHLAND § 212.
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Looking back now, it is undeniable that more doubt was cast, to a cer-
tain degree, on the original concept of reversing injustice in property mat-
ters inflicted by the political powers-that-be at both the federal and
regional levels, than in any other field. In particular, the so-called princi-
ple of restitution, the principle of restoring property, largely went astray
in the legislation which followed the Unification Treaty. According to the
statistics, over two million applications for restoration of property have
already been dealt with, with restitution awarded in 399,000 cases (ex-
cluding Berlin).22
However, at the time of the Unification Treaty the legislature also had
to decide how to make amends to all those who had suffered injustice
with regard to property and expropriation by the National Socialists. The
GDR did nothing about this, taking the view that it was a Nazi-free state
and had nothing whatsoever to do with the Third Reich. Thus in 1990,
numerous cases involved handling, which in legal terms was the heritage
of two distinct totalitarian regimes, that had ruled in Germany over the
course of only half a century.
The Federal German Constitutional Court has not yet resolved consti-
tutional issues involved in correcting injustices done with regard to prop-
erty in the GDR. Important cases still have not been decided,
23
especially those involving the problem of compensation. 24 The problem
that has repeatedly arisen has been finding the best way of achieving a
socially acceptable balance while integrating a property regime, which
has grown over forty years into the system governed by West German
property law. It is up to the legislature to do this, and the German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court has given it wide scope in this respect.
I am focusing on one area from this whole field of complex issues-the
so-called "Bodenreform" or land reform in the Russian zone between
1945 and 1949.25 The expropriations carried out have put the Court to a
particularly harsh test, maybe even stretching it beyond the limits of con-
stitutional judgment.
22. See Herrmann-Josef Rodenbach, Das Vermogensrechtsbereinigungsgesetz und
seine Implikationen, 20 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 1425 (1999) (showing figures).
23. For instance, a decision has yet to be taken on the constitutionality of the Law
Governing Compensation and Settlements. See Entsch~digungs-und Ausgleichsgesetz
(EALG), v. 27.9.1994 (BGBI. I S. 2624); Proceedings 1 BvR 2307/94 and 1408/95; see also
BVerfGE 95, 48 (illustrating other problematic issues).
24. A good example is the protection afforded by the all-German legal system to own-
ers of so-called "Datschen", challenged by proprietors claiming the right to use their own
property themselves. Over half the population in the former GDR owned one of these
weekend homes, which made up for travel restrictions, particularly abroad, and also pro-
vided a retreat from the prying of the state. The German Federal Constitutional Court has
largely ruled in favor of people using the "Datschen" statutory protection against eviction
provided in the Statute on the Alignment of the Law of Obligations. See Schuldrecht-
sanpassungsgesetz, v. 21.9.1994 (BGBI. I S. 2538); see also, 1 BvR 995/95 (July 13, 1999).
25. See WIEDERGUTMACHUNGSVERBOT?, DIE ENTEIGNUNGEN IN DER EHEMALIGEN
SBZ ZWISCHEN 1945 UN) 1949 (Bruno J. Sobotka ed., 1998) (providing a comprehensive
discussion of the issues).
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A brief statement of the facts is necessary to understand the issues
presented to the Court. In September 1945, the Soviet Union expropri-
ated, or had such expropriation carried out by German authorities under
occupational law, agricultural land and woodland, along with all the in-
ventory, from people considered to be war criminals or war debtors. No
compensation was paid. The Soviets also extended this measure to in-
clude all agricultural estates and forests over 100 hectares in size (about
250 acres), no matter what the owners' alleged political leanings were.
By the end of 1948, the confiscated areas totaled about 3.225 million hect-
ares (about 8 million acres). In addition, property in trade and industry
was also expropriated, affecting over 15,000 businesses. The circum-
stances under which owners were frequently forced to leave their prop-
erty were, in some cases, appalling.
The parties to the Unification Treaty, the GDR and the Federal Re-
public, agreed in 1990 that these expropriations carried out under occupa-
tional law or under occupational jurisdiction would not be reversed.
Upon Reunification, a specific regulation was included in the Basic Law
excepting, in constitutional terms, this particular item from the negotia-
tion agenda. With the normative force of legislation altering the Consti-
tution, Article 143(3) of the Basic Law confirms that restitution in these
cases is excluded. Under the German Constitution, the legislature is em-
powered to alter the Basic Law with the support of two-thirds of the
members of the Bundestag, and a two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat. 26
In contrast to the American constitution, the Basic Law may not be
amended if this affects the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20.27 In
the wake of appeals lodged by numerous people, the Federal German
Constitutional Court had the difficult task of deciding whether excluding
restitution, as in Article 143(3) of the Basic Law, in fact, amounted to a
"constitutional rule of law contrary to the Constitution," because it in-
fringed on Article 79(3) of the Basic Law. The Court denied this in two
rulings,28 proving that legal recourse is exhausted while the political en-
ergy of those concerned most certainly is not.29
The Court's arguments are based on an important presumption: the
fundamental elements of the principle of equality, which under Article
79(3) of the Basic Law may not be encroached upon, are not infringed by
the regulation laid down in Article 143(3) which makes provision for the
restoration of confiscated property in expropriations for which no com-
pensation was paid and are not covered by the inadmissibility of restitu-
tion laid down in the Unification Treaty. Meaning, above all, the
expropriations carried out after the GDR came into existence in 1949.
The Court continued by arguing that there was sufficient justification for
26. See GG art. 79(2).
27. See GG art. 79(3).
28. See BVerfGE 84, 90 (95); 94, 12 (15).
29. See Opfer von Enteignungsunrecht wollen ihren Widerstand fortsetzen, FAZ No.
123, May 31, 1999, at 17.
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ruling out restitution in view of the fact that, during the negotiations on
German unification, the GDR and the Soviet Union had insisted on in-
troducing this very arrangement. On further examination, the Federal
German Government was forced to accept this condition if it were to
achieve the unification of Germany at all.
The parties involved take the view that the Constitutional Court has
been misinformed or misled by the Federal German Government, and
strongly support this view in public debate. The legislature responsible
for the Unification Treaty pointed out that a final decision as to any kind
of state compensation was left to a future all-German parliament. 30 In
the meantime, the law has been enacted and the first senate of the Fed-
eral German Constitutional Court will be ruling on its constitutionality by
the end of this year. 31
The all-German authorities' prosecution of injustices inflicted by the
state is at the very center of measures for dealing with the circumstances
and the legal system, which actually prevailed in the GDR. This poses
very fundamental constitutional problems. It is standard practice in uni-
fied Germany to prosecute crimes committed in GDR territory by GDR
citizens. This is because when East Germany ceased to exist as a country,
a practical obstacle to prosecution also disappeared.
I would like to pick out just two matters from this constitutionally sen-
sitive field.32 First, crimes committed in connection with guarding the
fortified border between the GDR and the Federal Republic, 33 and sec-
ond, the prosecution of perversion of justice by judges and district attor-
neys in the GDR.
Courts in unified Germany have held that individuals working for the
GDR ministry of defense and guards patrolling the GDR border are lia-
ble under criminal law for killing people that try to escape to the West on
the border between East and West Germany. In general, these people
were killed by mines or deliberately shot merely for attempting to flee to
the West. A whole series of sentences have been passed in the Federal
Republic for crimes of this nature on the basis of GDR criminal law, un-
less the Federal German criminal code proved more lenient. Murder and
manslaughter were, of course, criminal offences under GDR criminal law
30. See Joint Declaration on the Regulation of Open Property Questions, June 15,
1990 F.R.G.-G.D.R.
31. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
32. For the constitutional prohibition of prosecuting GDR spies who did reconnais-
sance in the Federal Republic from GDR territory, see BVerfGE 92, 277. See also Gunter
Widmaier, Vom Grundsatz des rechtsstaatlichen Vertrauensschutzes, 4 KRITISCHE
VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FOR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 377 (1994) (dis-
cussing basic problems with prosecuting GDR spies).
33. See generally 2 KNUT SEIDEL, RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHE ASPEKTE DER ,,MAUER-
SCHCTZEN"-PROZESSE (1999); 3 DIE STRAFRECHTSJUSTIZ DER DDR IM SYSTEMWECHSEL
(Ulrich Drobnig ed., 1998); Jutta Limbach, Strafrecht und politische Verbrechen, JUTTrA
LIMBACH, IM NAMEN DES VOLKES. MACHT UND VERANTWORTUNG DER RICHTER 39




also, and subject to harsh prison sentences. 34 The same applied to crimi-
nal liability for instigating such crimes.35 The sentences passed have been
confirmed on principle by the Federal German Court of Justice.36
The appeals against the sentences passed by the criminal courts, which
were then lodged with the Federal German Constitutional Court, com-
plained, above all, about a violation of the so-called inadmissibility of
retroactivity in criminal law.37 Article 103(2) of the Basic Law states that
an act may only be prosecuted provided that it constituted a criminal of-
fense under the applicable law when the act was committed. 38 The con-
victed parties claimed the killings were not unlawful, since they were
justified under GDR law in force at the time in the GDR.
Two things about GDR practice in preventing attempts to escape to the
West need to be added. First, the authorities were not at all interested in
getting prompt medical assistance to people with bullet wounds or who
had been injured by mines. Second, the dead were frequently buried
without their relatives' knowledge. Next of kin were later told that the
victims had committed suicide. 39
The Federal German Constitutional Court rejected these appeals.40 In
the Court's opinion, Article 103(2) of the Basic Law offered protection
against the existing assessment of the criminal elements of an act that is
subsequently altered to the offender's disadvantage. Thus, legally accept-
able grounds already existing at the time the offense was committed still
applied, even if they had lapsed by the time criminal proceedings were
actually held. In the Court's opinion, the strict inadmissibility of retroac-
tivity in Article 103(2) justified, by reason of the Basic Law, that special
degree of reliability which criminal laws enjoy when adopted by a demo-
cratic legislature bound by constitutional rights. The Court held, how-
ever, that this special degree of reliability lapsed if the other state
stipulated criminal offenses in the field of the most severe criminal injus-
tice, but at the same time excluded criminal liability by providing justifi-
cation in given areas, such as demanding beyond the written rules of law
that such offenses be committed, aiding the perpetrators, and thus grossly
disregarding the human rights generally accepted under international law.
Thus, those in political power harbored extreme state injustice, which
could only persist as long as their powers actually continued to exist.
Ultimately the GDR was judged by its own standards, for under inter-
34. See §§ 112, 113 StGB [GDR Criminal Code].
35. See §§ 2, 22, No. 1 StGB.
36. See generally BGHSt 39, 1; BGHSt 39, 168; BGHSt 39, 199; BGHSt 39, 353;
BGHSt 40, 48; BGHSt 40,113; BGHSt 40, 218; BGHSt 40, 241; BGHSt 41, 10; BGHSt 41,
101.
37. See generally EBERHARD SCHMIDI)T-APMANN, MAUNZ-DORIG, GRUNDGESETZ,
KOMMENTAR, ART. 103 SECT. 2 (1992).
38. GG art. 103(2).
39. For details on how the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) influenced the selection
and supervision of border guards, see Frank Petzold, Heiner Timmerrnann, DIE DDR -
POLlrEK UND IIEOLOGIE ALS INSTRUMENT 543 (1999).
40. See BVerfGE 95, 96 (131).
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national law it had committed itself even in human rights issues.41 Of
particular significance are Articles 12(2) and 6(1), and clauses 1 and 3 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights dated December
19, 1966, which came into force for both German states on March 27,
1976. The GDR, in fact, failed to implement this Covenant in domestic
law pursuant to Article 51 of its constitution; however, this did not alter
the fact that under international law the covenant was binding on the
GDR. The GDR's border controls infringed upon the civil right of free-
dom to leave the country stipulated in Article 12(2) of the Civil Rights
Covenant quite simply because, contrary to the objective of Article (3) of
the Covenant, inhabitants of the GDR were, as a general rule and not
merely in exceptional circumstances, denied the right to leave the country
freely. According to the German Federal Court of Justice, both GDR
regulations and practice within East German borders contravened Article
6(1), clauses 1 and 3 of the Civil Rights Covenant, which stipulate that
every person has a natural right to life which may not be denied arbitrar-
ily.42 In any event, the covenant found that using firearms as a deterrent
for preventing third parties from crossing the border without permission
was going beyond the limit.
From a constitutional point of view, the Constitutional Court has con-
firmed the Federal German Court of Justice's finding that any grounds
justifying the application of the law must be left unheeded if these
grounds justified the deliberate killing of people not wanting anything
more than to pass the inner-German frontier, unarmed and without en-
dangering any objects generally recognized as enjoying legal protection.
In fact, the Federal German Court of Justice held that any grounds of this
kind, which quite simply gave priority to enforcing a ban on crossing a
border over safeguarding the human right to life, were null and void, be-
ing quite obviously an intolerable violation of the elementary precepts of
justice and human rights protected under international law.43 The Fed-
eral German Court of Justice maintained that this infringement was so
grave that it violated legal convictions about the value of life and human
dignity common to all nations. In a case like this, positive law had to
yield to justice.
The public approved this ruling, in particular the interpretation of Arti-
cle 103(2) of the Basic Law, without exception, although some criticism
from experts in criminal and constitutional law were forthcoming. 44 The
41. See BVerfGE 95, 96 (112).
42. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
43. See BGHSt 39, 1 (15-16). For reference to "Radbruch's Formula" mentioned here,
see GUSTAV RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 347, 353 (1963).
44. For the reaction of legal circles to the ruling issued by the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court on October 24, 1996, see Jorg Arnold, Einschrankung des Riickwirklng-
sgebotes sowie sorgfdltige Schuldpriifung bei den Thtungsfdllen an der DDR Grenze,
JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 400 (1997); Bundesverfassungsgericht contra Einigungsvertrag.
Der ,,Mauerschiitzen"-Beschlu3 des BVerfG auf dem strafrechtlichen Priifstand, JuRIs-
TENZEITUNG 115 (1997); Peter-Alexis Albrecht, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und die
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public accepted that the Court had to set a moral example. The details
are beyond the scope of this article, but it is interesting to note that the
outcome of the Federal German Constitutional Court's jurisdiction com-
plies with the rule given in Article 7(2) of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Thus, the
conviction or punishment of anyone guilty of an offense or omission
which, when committed, was punishable in accordance with the legal
principles generally recognized in the civilized world, may not be ex-
cluded on the grounds of the inadmissibility of retroactivity. The ultimate
irony is that, for constitutional reasons, the Federal Republic of Germany
has never ratified this rule. Practically speaking, prosecution has not
been widespread. Of sixty-two cases, only around half have ended up
with mild sentences being passed, with most of those being suspended. 45
Criminal law in the GDR also stated that perversion of justice consti-
tuted a criminal offense. 46 Criminal liability depended on whether the
judge or district attorney ruled "unlawfully to the advantage or disadvan-
tage of any party involved." The fundamental problem, which subse-
quently arose, can only be comprehended if the dubious facts
surrounding the allegations of perversion of justice are at least outlined.
In the fifties, the death penalty or long prison sentences were imposed
for relatively minor infringements of the GDR's so-called political crimi-
nal law, which included acts done while performing lesser functions in the
state security police or for enticing professionals from the GDR to go to
the West. Prison sentences were imposed on people who expressed a de-
sire to leave the GDR even though they did not do so publicly or cause
any kind of provocation, and of those who made enquiries about the pos-
sibility of leaving the country at West German facilities such as the Fed-
eral Republic's Permanent Mission in East Berlin.
In one instance, a district attorney deliberately twisted the facts and
dropped criminal proceedings for manslaughter brought against a mem-
ber of the state security police who had shot a person while under the
influence of alcohol. Prosecution of the judges and district attorneys in-
volved in these court rulings were carried out in accordance with the
GDR criminal code. It is obvious, though, that this practical application
of criminal law was countered with the reproach that the GDR criminal
strafrechtliche Verarbeitung von Systernrecht-eine deutsche Losung, NEUE JusTiz 1 (1997);
Kai Ambos, Nuremberg revisited - Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, das Volkerstrafrecht und
das Ruckwirkungsgebot, SrRAFVERrEIDIGER 39 (1997); Robert Alexy, Der Beschlu[3 des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts zu den Totungen an der innerdeutschen Grenze vom (1997);
Horst Dreier, Gustav Radbruch und die Mauerschuitzen, JURISTENZErrUNG 421 (1997);
Markus Krajewski, Mauerschfitzen und Menschenrechte, JURISrENZErrUNG 1054 (1997);
Klaus LUderssen, Entkriminalisierung durch Politisierung?, JURISTENZEITUNG 525 (1997);
Christian Starck, Anmerkung zu BVerfG Beschlu vom 24. Oktober 1996, JURIS-
TENZEIrUNG 147 (1997).
45. For more detailed figures, see Seidel, supra note 33, at 19; Lore Maria Peschel-
Gutzeit, Aufarbeitung von Systemunrecht durch die Justiz: Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, DIE
STRAFRECHTSJUSTIZ DER DDR IM SYSTEMWESHT 9, 13 (1988).
46. See § 244 StPO [GDR Criminal Code].
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code, in force at the time of the offense, was being applied superficially.
Actually, the criminal code was removed from the context of the GDR's
legal system and retroactively subjected to the values of a constitutional
order where justice was administered independently. Court rulings47 re-
flect the reaction to this reproach such that prosecuting the perversion of
justice has been restricted to cases where cruel and harsh penalties were
imposed that infringed upon fundamental human rights. These penalties
served to deter or even destroy political dissidents, and not to protect
objects subject to general legal protection. Perversion of justice was only
prosecuted in instances of gross injustice by the state, hidden under the
cover of ostensible judicial proceedings. 48
In terms of constitutional law, the Federal German Constitutional
Court has approved this jurisdiction passed by the criminal courts.49 The
reasons given are similar to those decisions in the cases of homicide com-
mitted on the inner-German border. In the view of the Court, grossly
disregarding generally recognized human rights in individual cases does
not constitute a violation of the inadmissibility of retroactivity laid down
in Article 102(2) of the Basic Law.50 There is an inner-German irony
here, too: in the criminal proceedings brought against them, the GDR
judges on trial claimed, among other things, that they had been able to
impose long prison sentences without causing any harm to the individuals
because the West ransomed political prisoners anyway.
III. PROVISIONAL SUMMARY
A. THE INTERPRETATION OF BASIC RIGHTS: MODIFICATION BOTH
OBSCURED AND APPARENT
The constitutional problems of Reunification call for assessment of the
strength of the Basic Law, the scope of which has been extended-essen-
tially unaltered-to include the territory of East Germany. However, in
some rulings, the Federal German Constitutional Court's solutions to
these problems have resulted in an apparent modification of previous in-
terpretations of constitutional law. It has been said that in 1999, the Fed-
eral Republic and its constitution had existed for forty-one years plus
nine, not fifty.51 This modification applies in particular to civil and simi-
lar fundamental rights. I have already mentioned Article 12(1) and Arti-
cle 103(2) of the Basic Law as examples of such modification of the
47. See genearlly BGHSt 40, 30; BGHSt 40, 169; BGHSt 40, 272; BGHSt 41, 247;
BGHSt 41, 317.
48. For court rulings, see Friedrich-Christian Schroeder, Der Bundesgerichtshof und
der Grundsatz, ulla poene sine lege, 2 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 90, 10
(1999); Manfred Seebode, DDR-Justiz vor Gericht, FESTSCHRIFT FOR THEODOR
LENCKNER 585 (Albin Eser et al., eds. 1998); VOLKER KASEWIETER, DER BEGRIFF DER
RECHTSBEUGUNG IM DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHT, 80 (1999).
49. See BVerfG, (2. Kammer des Zweiten Senats), Beschl. v. 7.4.1998, 35 NJW.
50. See GG art. 102(2).




Constitution. Other examples exist, such as the interpretation of Article
2(2), clause 1 of Basic Law regarding abortion.
In its 1975 ruling, the Federal German Constitutional Court52 deter-
mined that under Article 2(2), clause 1 and Article 1(1) of the Basic Law,
the legislature was obliged to apply the criminal code to safeguard un-
born life if there was no other way of achieving the protection demanded
by the Constitution. In the second ruling on abortion issued in 1973, 53
the Court granted the legislation more leeway on the question of whether
abortion is grounds for prosecution. The only factor derived from the
Basic Law was the prohibition against declaring abortions justifiable (as
opposed to illegal) if they are carried out without any ascertainable medi-
cal, social or ethical grounds. The Court's shifting opinion may certainly
be attributable to the change in social attitudes towards the role of wo-
men and doctors when it comes to actually protecting unborn life. How-
ever, it must also be seen in the light of the fact that, upon Reunification,
a large number of people from the former GDR, where abortion was not
only exempt from punishment but where there was even a legal right to
abortion, came within the scope of the Basic Law and its commitment to
unborn life. 54
The rulings issued by the Court with reference to so-called "GDR pen-
sions" dated April 28, 1999,55 also reflect the way the interpretation of
basic rights has changed as a result of Reunification. The GDR promised
its political, scientific, military and administrative elite fairly generous
pensions, which the all-German legislature proceeded to cut to various
degrees and for various reasons under the rules given in the Unification
Treaty.56 In its assessment of these pension laws in terms of constitu-
tional law, the Federal German Constitutional Court also took Article 14
of the Basic Law as a criterion. In the rulings made by the Constitutional
Court over the years, the concept of protection of property has always
benefitted pension rights and claims if they accrued on the strength of an
individual's work, and, in particular, if they were based on contributions
made to the pension insurance scheme. 57
In the GDR though, legal rights of this nature were not always based
on contributions, at least not on sufficient old age pension contributions
which had been deducted from wages. In view of the particular circum-
stances surrounding the GDR's old age pension and wages system, the
Court held-and this was a very innovative move-that the concept of
protection of property laid down in Article 14(1) of the Basic Law also
52. See generally BVerfGE 39, If.
53. See generally BVerfGE 88, 203. The problems at issue here, which are extremely
complicated in legal terms, cannot be elucidated at this point.
54. The all-German legislature has been charged in Article 31(4) of the Unification
Treaty with finding a uniform regulation to protect unborn life. See Unification Treaty,
supra note 10, art. 31(4).
55. See 1 BvL 32/95; 1 BvL 22/95; 1 BvR 1926/96; 1 BvL 11/94 (to be published shortly
in AMTLICHE SAMMLUNG DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS, vol. 100).
56. See Unification Treaty, supra note 10, annex II, ch. VIII, area H, § IlI, No. 9(b).
57. See BVerfGE 69, 272 (301-02).
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applied if the pension claims and rights had accrued mainly on the basis
of the individual's work as opposed to insurance contributions. 58 In this
respect, the Court strongly took into account the idea of state pensions as
recognition for a lifetime of work.59
B. DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR DEALING WITH THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES CREATED BY REUNIFICATION
It would take a thorough study of the Federal German Constitutional
Court's judicial decisions to determine what general principles have de-
veloped to cope with one part of the German people changing over to a
legal system which has a completely different structure and is dominated
by completely different values and principles from which they previously
lived. Only a few indications can be given here. For instance, the Court
automatically assumed that upon the GDR joining the Federal Republic,
despite their underlying differences, there would be legal continuity with
regard to legal relations in everyday life and legal institutions common to
both legal systems, such as marriage, movable property, or sales contracts
and leases.60 The general policy it adopted was that under certain cir-
cumstances, and to a certain extent, there was a need to uphold the trust
which citizens of the former GDR put in the continuation of their old
legal order.61
However, the Basic Law was not yet binding on this legal system,
which is why the Court has emphasized time and again that the West
German constitution never claimed to apply to GDR territory, and it has
drawn numerous conclusions from this.62 Another significant point in the
Court's decisions is that the Basic Law does not put all-German govern-
ment agencies under any obligation to employ legal means-having ret-
roactive effect if at all possible-to put citizens of the former GDR in the
position they would have been in had they spent their lives in the Federal
Republic with all its freedom and economic wealth.63
Ultimately, the way the Basic Law developed assured that the Federal
Republic would not have to take responsibility for acts by the authorities
on GDR territory, which it regards as being a contravention of both the
law and the constitution.64 However bitter this realization for those con-
cerned, this adjudication amounts to a realistic acceptance of the actual
limits, above all when making good the injustices suffered by individuals,
such as discrimination in working life experienced by those confessing to
belong to a Christian church or disassociating themselves from the East
58. See GG art. 14(1).
59. See 1 BvL 32/95 circular p. 48.
60. See BVerfGE 84, 133 (147); BVerfGE 85, 360 (373); BVerfGE 91, 294 (309);
BVerfGE 95, 267 (305-06). See generally Georg Brunner, Fortgeltung des Rechts der bisher-
igen DDR, 9 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND § 210.
61. See BVerfGE 88, 384 (404).
62. See BVerfGE 84, 90 (122-23).
63. See id.; see also BVerfGE 95, 267 (309).
64. See BVerfGE 84, 90 (122-23).
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German political order.65 The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
legislature has a particularly broad scope when it comes to compensating
injustice inflicted by another state;66 it is sufficient that such compensa-
tion complies with the precept of justice, at least in principle.
In solving the problems posed by Reunification, the Federal German
Constitutional Court has ultimately confirmed and accepted the limits im-
posed by the financial restrictions to the all-German budget. This budget
has had to bear a tremendous burden, and it will continue to do so for
some time. One such restriction, for example, has played a role in the
legislator's decision not to put pensioners from the GDR elite (e.g. uni-
versity academic staff) on a level with corresponding professional groups
in West Germany in respect to pension rights. In terms of constitutional
law, the Federal German Constitutional Court has approved this funda-
mental decision supporting unequal treatment.
C. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
In respect to the constitutional issues brought up by Reunification, I
prefer not to evaluate the jurisdiction of the Federal German Constitu-
tional Court, being involved in it myself. In regards to its rulings, I should
merely like to state that, notwithstanding any criticism which has been
made in specific cases, the decisions it has passed are those of a Constitu-
tional Court serving the entire German people, not merely those of a
German court with a Western bias. Maybe it has also contributed, as
such, towards the inner unification of Germany. In many issues the Fed-
eral German Constitutional Court has provided an answer to the ques-
tion of whether the Unification Treaty-and above all, the way it is
interpreted and applied by all-German government agencies-is compati-
ble with the constitutional rights of the East Germans. In doing so, it has
taken on the important task of arbitrating between the viewpoint of the
majority as represented in the all-German law-making bodies, and the
Germans in the East.
In a most practical manner, its jurisdiction has conveyed to the citizens
in the new Linder the basic idea of a constitutional state, namely that
law, and in particular constitutional law, has priority over majority polit-
ics. This does not mean that the Federal German Constitutional Court's
rulings on the constitutional issues of German unity deserve approval in
all respects. Like all the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction, it, too, is sub-
ject to criticism. In reference to criticism of its jurisdiction, I should just
like to add, quoting the Minister of Finance in one of the new Lander:
"Next time we have a Reunification, we'll make a better job of it."
65. See generally Hans-Jurgen Papier, Vergangenheitsbewaltigung: Abwicklung,
Ahndung, Entschadigung, 9 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND § 213.
66. See BVerfGE 13, 31 (36); BVerfGE 13, 39 (43); BVerfGE 27, 253 (286); BVerfGE
84, 90 (125); BVerfGE 94, 315 (326).
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